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Abstract
Statistical data protection, also known as statistical disclosure control, is about methods that try to prevent
published statistical information (tables, individual information) from disclosing the contribution of speci3c
respondents, who may be individuals or enterprises. In addition to keeping disclosure risk acceptably low,
methods used for statistical data protection should not signi3cantly damage the utility of the data being
protected. This paper surveys di5erent ways to assess the risk of disclosure in the protection of both individual
data (called microdata) and tabular data. A noteworthy result also presented is that the most widely used rule
for assessing disclosure risk in tabular data protection is 6awed.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Statistical data con3dentiality, also known as statistical disclosure control (SDC), is the discipline
that seeks to modify statistical data so that they can be published by statistical o:ces without giving
away con3dential information that can be linked to speci3c respondents behind the data. Although
released information should be as detailed as possible from the users’ viewpoint, data utility (i.e.
accuracy) is in con6ict with respondents’ privacy. In other words, a tradeo5 must be reached between
the user’s wish that the information loss caused by SDC methods be as low as possible and the
wish by respondents that the disclosure risk (risk that released records can be linked to speci3c
respondents) be kept low as well. See [2,3,16] for details on SDC methods in use.
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1.1. Contribution and plan of this paper
Statistical o:ces release two kinds of data through their statistical databases: microdata sets (in-
dividual respondent records) and tabular data. Any attempt to compare methods for statistical data
protection should focus on two basic attributes:
(1) Disclosure risk: A measure of the risk to respondent con3dentiality that the data releaser (typ-
ically a statistical agency) would experience as a consequence of releasing the table.
(2) Data utility: A measure of the value of the released table to a legitimate data user.
A 3rst approach for measuring data utility is to take generic measures such as the reciprocal of
the mean squared error between the original and released data [5,3]. While this may be useful as a
crude approach, a more accurate utility assessment must necessarily take into account the speci3c
data uses the user is interested in. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no universal data utility measure.
The situation for disclosure risk is quite di5erent, since it does not depend on particular data uses.
Therefore, a uni3ed approach for measuring disclosure risk is reasonable and even desirable. Such a
uni3ed approach exists in the literature for tabular data, but not for microdata. The contribution of
this paper is twofold: 3rst, we propose a uni3ed risk assessment methodology for microdata based
on record linkage and, second, we highlight the shortcomings of the most commonly used rule for
risk assessment in tabular data protection.
In Section 2, disclosure risk assessment for microdata is discussed. Section 3 deals with disclosure
risk assessment for tabular data; in particular, it is shown that the (very popular) dominance rule
used to assess disclosure risk is 6awed. Conclusions are summarized in Section 4.
2. Disclosure risk assessment in microdata protection
Disclosure risk assessment for microdata is performed a posteriori, that is, after protecting the
microdata. First, an original microdata set is protected, and then the risk of disclosure is computed
by taking as one of the inputs the protected microdata set.
Literature on disclosure risk for microdata is basically related to nonperturbative methods based
on sampling, in which the protected microdata set is obtained as a sample of the original data set.
Disclosure risk here is measured as the probability that a sample unique is a population unique
[6,14]. If the size of the sample is similar to the size of the whole population, such a probability
can be dangerously high; in that case, an intruder who locates a unique value in the released sample
can be almost sure that there is a single individual in the population with that value. This could
lead to identi3cation of that individual.
The uniqueness property as stated above is no longer relevant for perturbative methods, since in
this case the whole microdata set is published, but with some distortion. There is not much literature
on disclosure risk that can be used for a broad class of perturbative methods; disclosure risk measures
tend to be method-speci3c (measures described in [1] are still up-to-date). Empirical methods, like
record linkage techniques, provide a more uni3ed approach to disclosure risk assessment for pertur-
bative methods. We brie6y describe below two methods for record linkage which yield empirical
disclosure risk measures. An analytical measure based on interval disclosure is also described.
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2.1. Distance-based record linkage
Distance-based record linkage was 3rst described in [12] for the speci3c case of numerical variables
and using the Euclidean distance. We next discuss how to generalize it for any perturbative method
provided that a distance between the original and the masked variables can be de3ned (note that
a distance can be de3ned not only between numerical variables, but also between some types of
categorical variables, such as ordinal variables).
Let the original and masked data sets consist both of d variables (it is assumed that both data sets
contain the same variables). We de3ne that a record in the masked data set corresponds to the nearest
record in the original data set, where “nearest” means at shortest d-dimensional distance. Assume
further that the intruder can only access i key variables of the original data set (such variables may
be available in external data sets accessible to the intruder) and tries to link original and masked
records based on these i variables.
Linkage then proceeds by computing i-dimensional distances between records in the original and
the masked data sets (distances are computed using only the i key variables). If they are numerical,
variables used are standardized to avoid scaling problems. A record in the masked data set is labeled
as “correctly linked” when the nearest record using i-dimensional distance is the corresponding one
(i.e., the nearest record using d-dimensional distance). The percentage of “correctly linked” records
is a measure of disclosure risk.
Distance-based record linkage was originally designed for numerical variables. In order to extend
it for dealing with categorical variables, we need to de3ne a distance for this type of variables,
which can be done as follows:
Denition 1.
(1) For a nominal variable V , the only permitted operation is comparison for equality. This leads
to the following distance de3nition:
dV (c; c′) =
{
0 if c = c′;
1 if c = c′;
where c and c′ correspond to categories for variable V . An alternative de3nition applicable in
some cases is to use a string matching algorithm to compute the distance between two nominal
variables; this is especially appropriate for nominal variables such as names and addresses,
which can contain typos or be written in several formats (see [15]).
(2) For an ordinal variable V , let 6V be the total order operator over the range of V . Then,
the distance between categories c and c′ is de3ned as the number of categories between the
minimum and the maximum of c and c′ divided by the cardinality of the range (denoted by
D(V )):
dV (c; c′) =
|c′′: min(c; c′)6V c′′6V max(c; c′)|
|D(V )| :
Note that De3nition 1 speci3es a distance for a single variable. To obtain a distance for pairs of
records, the distances corresponding to the variables in the records should be aggregated.
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2.2. Probabilistic record linkage
In [10], a probabilistic record linkage method was described and illustrated on the 1985 Census
of Tampa, Florida. The matching algorithm uses the linear sum assignment model to “pair” records
in the two 3les to be matched (the original 3le and the masked 3le in our case). The de3nition
of “correctly linked” records is the same as in distance-based record linkage. The percentage of
correctly paired records is a measure of disclosure risk.
Although slower and more complex than the distance-based method described in the previous
section, this approach is sometimes attractive because it only requires the user to provide two
probabilities as input: one is an upper bound of the probability of a false match, and the other an
upper bound of the probability of false nonmatch. Unlike distance-based record linkage, probabilistic
record linkage does not require rescaling variables nor makes any assumption on their relative weight
(by default, distance-based record linkage assumes that all variables have the same weight).
2.3. Interval disclosure
The intruder may not be satis3ed with pairing masked records and original records. For numerical
or ordinal variables, she may wish to go further and 3nd an interval around each variable value in
a masked record which contains the corresponding value in the corresponding original record. We
next describe the interval disclosure measure we used in our comparative study [4].
For a record in the masked data set, compute rank intervals as follows: (1) rank each variable
independently; (2) de3ne a rank interval around the value the variable takes for record r as the
interval centered on the rank of the value of record r and comprising the surrounding ranks di5ering
among them less than p% of the total number of records; (3) convert rank intervals into value
intervals by mapping ranks to values. Then the proportion of original values which fall into the
interval centered around their corresponding masked value is a measure of disclosure risk. A 100%
proportion means that an attacker is completely sure that the original value lies in the interval around
the masked value (interval disclosure).
2.4. Example
Let us consider the 3les A and B in Table 1. Both 3les contain 8 records and 3 variables (Name,
Surname and Age). For the sake of understandability, the 3les are de3ned so that records in the same
row correspond to matched pairs and records in di5erent rows correspond to unmatched pairs. The
goal of record linkage in this example is to classify all possible pairs so that pairs with both records
in the same row are classi3ed as linked pairs and all the other pairs are classi3ed as nonlinked pairs.
Next, we illustrate how distance-based and probabilistic record linkage would be carried out in
this example:
• In distance-based record linkage, a distance is de3ned for variable pairs (Name A, Name B),
(Surname A, Surname B) and (Age A, Age B). One possibility to aggregate those distances and
obtain a record-level distance is to use the sum of squares as an aggregation function.
• In probabilistic record linkage, we consider all record pairs (a; b)∈A × B. For each record pair,
a coincidence vector is computed as a binary string consisting of as many bits as variables are
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Table 1
Records in the 3les A and B to be linked
Name A Surname A Age A Name B Surname B Age B
Joan Casanovas 19 Joan Casanovas 19
Pere Joan 17 Pere Joan 17
J.M. Casanovas 35 J.Manel Casanovas 35
Juan Garcia 53 Juan Garcia 53
Ricardo Garcia 14 Ricard Garcia 14
Pere Garcia 18 Pere Garcia 82
Juan Garcia 18 Juan Garcia 18
Ricard Tanaka 14 Ricard Tanaka 18
in the records; the ith bit of the coincidence vector is 1 if the values of the ith variable in both
record are the same and is 0 otherwise. For the 3les in Table 1, there are 8 possible di5erent
coincidence vectors. In general, the number of di5erent coincidence vectors is much less than the
number of record pairs in A×B (64 in the case of Table 1). Yet, in probabilistic record linkage,
the classi3cation of any pair (a; b) as linked or nonlinked is solely based on its coincidence vector.
3. Disclosure risk assessment in tabular data protection
Tabular data constitute the most traditional output released by statistical agencies. Being aggregate
data, one might infer that tables cannot leak information about speci3c respondents. As argued in
[8], it turns out that table cells often do contain information on a single or very few respondents,
which implies a disclosure risk for the data of those respondents. In these cases, disclosure control
methods must be applied to the tables prior to their release.
Disclosure assessment for tables is usually performed a priori, that is, before tables are protected.
The standard approach is to use a sensitivity rule to decide whether a table cell is sensitive and
should be protected.
3.1. A priori risk assessment through sensitivity rules
For magnitude tables (normally related to economic data), there are two widely accepted rules to
decide whether a cell is sensitive:
(n; k)-Dominance: In this rule, n and k are two parameters with values to be speci3ed. A cell is
called sensitive if the sum of the contributions of n or fewer respondents represents a fraction k or
more of the total cell value. Usually k is a fraction higher than 0.6.
pq-Rule: The prior–posterior rule is another rule gaining increasing acceptance. It also has two
parameters p and q. It is assumed that, prior to table publication, each respondent can estimate the
contribution of each other respondent to within less than q percent. A cell is considered sensitive
if, posterior to the publication of the table, someone can estimate the contribution of an individual
respondent to within less than p percent. A special case is the p%-rule: in this case, no knowledge
prior to table publication is assumed, i.e. the pq-rule is used with q= 100.
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3.2. A critique to the dominance rule
According to [7,9,11], the (n; k)-dominance rule is the most popular one for magnitude tables,
followed by the p%-rule and the pq-rule. Yet, it is signi3cant to note that the US Census Bureau
switched in 1992 from the dominance rule to the p%-rule, and the German Statistisches Bundesamt
did the same in 2001.
The dominance rule has received critiques for failing to adequately re6ect the risk of disclosure,
but these have been limited to numerical counterexamples for particular choices of n and k. The
following is a counterexample from [13] for the particular case n= 1:
Example 1 (Robertson and Ethier, 2002): In the dominance rule, let n = 1 and k = 0:6 (60%).
Then a cell with value 100 and contributions 59, 40, 1 is declared not sensitive, while a cell with
value 100 and contributions 61, 20, 19 would be declared sensitive. Assume now that the second
largest respondent of both cells knows the total 100 and is interested in estimating the contribution
of the largest respondent. Then, for the (59; 40; 1) cell, she removes her contribution and gets an
upper bound 100− 40= 60 for the largest contribution. For (61; 20; 19) the upper bound she gets is
100− 20 = 80, much farther from the real largest contribution. So the cell declared nonsensitive by
the rule allows better inferences than the cell declared sensitive!
We generalize below the critique in the above example for any values of n and k. Assume a cell
X in a table takes a value x which is formed by N respondent contributions x1; : : : ; xN . Equivalently,
x = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN :
The dominance rule declares X to be sensitive if a few contributions (n or less) add up to a
substantial fraction of x (k or more).
In order to construct a nonsensitive cell, we need the following result.
Lemma 1. For any integer n and k ∈ (0; 1], there exists an integer N and r ∈ [0; 1) such that
f(r) =
rn − 1
rN − 1 = k: (1)
A nonsensitive cell is now constructed as follows:
Construction 1 (Non-sensitive cell Xns):
(1) Take r ∈ [0; 1) and N as de-ned in Lemma 1. Then it holds that
k =
rn − 1
rN − 1 =
n∑
i=1
ri(r − 1)
rN+1 − r : (2)
(2) Let
Ri :=
ri(r − 1)
rN+1 − r : (3)
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(3) Consider a cell Xns whose N relative contributions are
xi=x =


Ri for i = 1; : : : ; n− 1 and i = n+ 2; : : : ; N;
Rn −  for i = n;
Rn+1 +  for i = n+ 1;
where  := (Rn − Rn+1)=3. With this choice of , one still has xn=x¿xn+1=x.
(4) According to Expression (2), the n largest relative contributions x1=x; : : : ; xn=x add to k − .
Therefore, there is no subset of n contributions adding to k, so Xns is clearly not sensitive
according to the dominance rule.
A sensitive cell is constructed as follows.
Construction 2 (Sensitive cell Xs):
(1) Take the same values N; n and k used in Construction 1.
(2) Consider a cell Xs whose relative contributions are
xi=x =
{
Ri for i = 1; : : : ; n;
(1− k)=(N − n) for i = n+ 1; : : : ; N:
(3) By construction, the sum of the n relative contributions x1=x; : : : ; xn=x is k. Thus, Xs is declared
sensitive by the (n; k)-dominance rule.
We next show that the cell declared nonsensitive by the dominance rule can yield a closer upper
bound for the largest contribution than the cell declared sensitive.
Theorem 1. Let n and k be the parameters of the dominance rule. Assume a coalition of the n
second largest contributors want to upper bound the largest contribution. For any n and k, if N
is taken large enough, then the coalition gets a proportionally closer upper bound for the case of
Xns than for the case of Xs.
The following example illustrates that N does not need to be very large for Theorem 1 to hold.
Example 2. For n = 1; k = 0:369 and N = 3, we have r = 0:9. The largest relative contribution is
x1=x = 0:369 for both Xs and Xns. The tail of the N − n − 1 = 1 smallest relative contribution is
0.298893 for Xns and 0.315498 for Xs.
Theorem 1 highlights a major 6aw in the dominance rule. Note that n can be as small as 1 and,
in that case, a single cell contributor (the second largest) can, without any help, get more precise
estimates on the largest contribution for a cell declared nonsensitive than for a cell declared sensitive.
This gives some theoretical justi3cation to the decision of leading statistical agencies to abandon
the dominance rule in favor of sensitivity rules with more general de3nitions of sensitivity, like the
pq-rule or the p%-rule.
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4. Conclusion
For microdata protection, we have proposed empirical disclosure risk measures based on record
linkage which should be preferred to conventional measures based on uniqueness because, un-
like the latter, the former measures apply to both perturbative and nonperturbative disclosure con-
trol methods. In particular, a general distance-based record linkage method has been
presented.
For tabular data protection, it has been shown that the most widely used sensitivity rule for a
priori risk assessment, the dominance rule, is 6awed. This justi3es the current trend to abandon this
rule in favor of other rules.
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Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1. For 3xed n and N , with n¡N , the function
f(r) =
rn − 1
rN − 1
bijectively maps the interval [0; 1) onto the interval (n=N; 1]. The lower bound of the image interval
is determined as
lim
r→1f(r) =
n
N
:
Thus, the lemma holds if we take N large enough so that n=N ¡k.
Proof of Theorem 1. For both Xs and Xns, the n second largest contributors know that the largest
contribution is upper-bounded by the total x minus their own contributions, that is
x16 x − (x2 + x3 + · · ·+ xn+1): (A.1)
The distance between x1 and the upper bound (4) is exactly the sum of the N − n − 1 smallest
contributions. We next show that, for large enough N , this sum is smaller for Xns than for Xs (since
x1 is the same for both cells, this is equivalent to showing that the upper bound on the largest
contribution is proportionally closer for Xns). Now, both Xns and Xs total to x, so we can use in
what follows relative contributions rather than absolute contributions for both cells. For Xns, the
N − n smallest relative contributions add to 1 − k +  by construction; therefore, the N − n − 1
smallest relative contributions add to 1− k +  minus the (n+ 1)th largest relative contribution
(1− k) + − (Rn+1 + ) = (1− k)− kr
n(r − 1)
rn − 1 : (A.2)
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To obtain the last term of expression (5), we have used that k = (rn − 1)=(rN − 1). On the other
hand, for Xs, the sum of the N − n− 1 smallest relative contributions is
(N − n− 1)(1− k)
N − n = (1− k)−
1− k
N − n : (A.3)
If N →∞, expression (6) approaches 1− k. On the other hand, if we let N →∞, then r is such
that k = 1− rn (according to Lemma 1). In this case, expression (5) becomes
(1− k)− k(1− k)(r − 1)
1− k − 1 = r(1− k)¡ (1− k):
Thus, N can be taken large enough so that expression (6) is larger than expression (5), which causes
the theorem to hold.
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